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THE ROLE: OF THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

An elected official can hardly expect universal approval of his
position on every issue.

Almost invariably some people will agree

him and others will disagree, sometimes very vehemently.

·~th

And I must

say that a Member of Congress pricked by public criticism bleeds at
least as profusely as any other human being .
In a decade and a half of service in Congress, I have been on
sick call for this reason on a number of occasions.

I have learned to

accept occasional wounds as a part of my job, as an occupational hazard.
There is one issue , however, which I have repeatedly tackled in
Congress and have repeatedly come out, not licking my wounds, but
miraculously unscathed .

That issue is the preservation of the integrity

of the Marine Corps.
While Members of Congress must , out of conviction, sometimes run
counter to the immediate flow of public opinion, it is not a very
pleasant experience .

It is always preferable, if you can do so honestly,

- 2 to find yourself

fl~Jing

downstream vith public s nt

nt rather thnn

truggling upstrcac, half- drowned, against it.
co~s

Beyond the natural gratification vhich

to an elect d official

vhcn he finds his ovn heart and the public pulse beating in perfect
unison - - beyond that, I have a special pleasure in fighting for the
integrity of t he Corps .
Marines.

OJ~I

As a•

e• aeaee1,

I tak

personal pride in the

Of course, I also take personal pride in the Arcy and the Navy,

as an ex-member of each of those Services .

But I think I ooy be pardoned

if I tend to be a l ittle prouder of my Marine background .

I vas only a

r~ ~
private in the Army .

I vas only an

or~ltU•lfY

seamanr-,in the r;avy .

But vith

that same percept i veness vhich p rompted the Murine Corps to recognize your
qualities of leader ship , the Corps also recognized mine .
my hitch in the Marines as a

{'F C .

~~vai~ fi~e\

I emerged from

a 1 ess

That distinction , I reali ze , does not, in itself, qualify me to speak
to you on "The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy ."

IleverthA-

less , I feel that the s ubject is of such great importance that it should

- 3 be considered not only by privates --

Jr.~rlv
qpdipa~

or first class -- and

Senators 1 but by thoughtful Americans throughout the nation .

I think

it is an especially pertinent one for you men who are graduating today
into command positions in the Corps.

The Marines have traditionally

operated with high effectiveness as a principal military instrument of
this nation's foreign policy during peacetime just as they have more than
once proved their tremendous capabilities when the peace has been violated .
One explanation for this outstanding service may well be that the
Corps has always maintained a strict professional regard for the American
principle of civilian control of military power.

That principle, as I am

sure you have been taught , is absolutely essential for the proper function ing of our system of government .

It is not enoughf that Congress determines

appropriations and organizational arrangements, and that the President and
his civilian assistants direct the administrative management of the military .
The American concept goes further .

It requires that the military shall

only be used whenever, wherever, and in whatever manner the politically

r

ponsible civ
hip, through

only t

1 ctions, can b

h ld c. countable to tb

pcop

of th

nation.
()./

In t

pr s nt

tate of vorld c.ffairo,

is not easily maintained .

~

It is subject to all the str ss s and strain

that arise from the tense international situation .

In a crisis, vith th

threat of vorld conflict ever present, it is not unnatural to turn to
distinguished military leaders for guidance , to rely h avily on their
judgment, and sometimes it is profitable to the nation to do so.

lleverthc-

less , the principle of civilian control remains essential to democratic
government as ve knov it .
Primary responsibility for the preservation of this principle rests
vith our civilian leadership; that leadership must be villing to assume
the heavy responsibilities of decision in this dangerou vorld.

But I

think you vill agree that considerable responsibility also rests vith the
military.

They must understand and accept the limits as vell as the

- 5 challenges of their profession in the conduct of the nation's affairs ,
particularly its foreign affairs .
Perhaps I can illustrate this point with an anecdote .

During the

Civil War, the story goes, certain Members of Congress left their desks
in Washington and went to the battlefields in Virginia .

There, they

insisted upon assuming the tactical command of the Union forces.

After

having thrown the campaign into confusion, they beat a hasty retreat to
Washington where they arrived mud-spattered, trembling, and presumably
chastised.
If the story is amusing, it is because it is easy to recognize the
absurdity of this escapade .

These Congressmen apparently assumed that

their training in politics equipped them to run the Army.

They also

distorted and distended the functions of their office out of all true
proportion.
The moral of the story is simple enough:

Congressmen ought not to

assume that political training provides an automatic background for

- 6 military leadership and, in military affairs , th ir rol

ought not to

exceed the constitutional pavers of their office.
IP-t us put the shoe on the other foot.

The coral is nov this :

-

Military leaders ought not to assume that militcry training provides an
autocatic background for politics , whether national or international, and

-

they ought not in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy exceed the
pavers of their appointive office .
Just as the distorted behavior of the Congressmen in the Civil War
could have produced tragic results as easily as humorous, so too can the
distorted behavior of military leaders .
It has never been easy to draw a clear line as to the area of competence and authority of the Armed Services in foreign policy.
the past 15 years have made it even more difficult .

Events of

First of all , during

th i e period, some among us , civilian and military alike, have developed a
distorted sense of the nature of what this country is trying to do in its
relations vith other nations and how it can most effectively go about doing

- 7 it .

Foreign policy is simply the course by which we attempt to provide

for the safety of the nation and the advancement of its interests in a
complex and dangerous world .

That is its only reason
~

for being.

To

carry out our policy we require military strength but we must also bring
into play nonmilitary instruments and measures to influence conditions
throughout the world.

Possibly it is because these nonmilitary measures

are less dramatic , less newsworthy, and tend to affect us and our families
less directly, that we sometimes lose our perspective and regard them as
less important t han military actions .

Sometimes there is a tendency to view

nonmilitary measures merely as supplements of our military policy1 when in
fact the reverse is closer to thetruth.
You men need hardly to be reminded of this fact .

If you know the

history of the Corps, you know that the Marines have been sent to foreign
territories and to overseas bases only from time to time and only after the
~

failure of other methods to protect American citizens and interests.

In

countless day- to-day situations arising in our foreign relations throughout
the world the military instrument is in no way involved.

As f r

lu

ures fai
int r st

to

of th

v n th n v

s~l

p~oduce

u

of fore

situation

United States, thnt

hav

1

it i

i

curity

favor ble to the vita
uch u

csy

bee~

invoked military force only in r

n c

ponce to nggr s ion.

That ve have waited for our enemy to ohov b yond all shadow of doubt that
he intends to strike us , rather than strike the first blow ourselves, docs
not mean that

~e

are slow-witted or even patient.

we are following a fundamental
final ,
........

~erican

It menno simply that

principle:

that force is the

not the first arbiter in the affairs of men nnd nations.

has done more to toughen the moral fiber of this

count~J

Nothing

than that principl .

No other single factor has served to sustain our morale during the long and
gruelling waro which we have had to fight .

Nothing has done more to turn

the hearts and hopes of mankind to this nation.
comes when

thi~

And I hope the dny never

nation shall use its micht in any way other than for

protection against the urogant, the aggressive , and the ruthless.
The role of the military in foreign policy, then, is to provide a r s rv
of pawer to support negotiations concerning our just interests in the vorld

- 9 and to defend those interests if they are attacked.
the vords reserve and support .

I vant to underline

Responsibility for determining vhat our

interests are and vhen and hov they are to be defended is vested in the
President and his Secretary of State .

The Department of Defense and

other agencies of the government , in the per formance of their duties have
an influence in this determination, but final responsibility cannot rest
~

in any body other than the Department of State or the President himself .
Since the beginning of World War II, hovever, the role of the military
in American foreign policy has assumed proportions of great magnitude .
During the var the Armed Services inevitably became the foremost element
in carrying out American policy .

Since the close of those hostilities the

Services have continued to serve prominently in this connection, due to the
nature of postwar diplomacy and developments .
The occupation of Germany and Japan, and the control of trust territories,
among other things, has brought the Armed Services directly into foreign
policy to a degree

unpre e ~dented

in peacetime .

To some extent, the

- 10 -

the

vas true of the r;o-col d Tn.u:1nn Doctrin

Trucan Doctrine, the

~d

of 1

7. Uruier

Forces not only ron military training m1

to strengthen the security of Greece and Turkey against

C~n1

t:h

io

t aggression,

but of necessity played a significant role in the formulation of policJ
vith respect to thooe countrieo.

Subsequently, they have had on

influence in foreign policy in connection vith

NA-~ ,

eno~ou

nutunl aid and cilitary

assistance missions in numerous countries, the Korean var, overseas boocs,
and treaties vith nations in the Western Pacific .
I think that one ct the chief problems emanating

fr~

this chain of

developments is that in many instances there has been a tendency to trent
individual military programs and po]Cies os separate and distinct military
affairs , vhereas they actually arc parts of the totality of American foreign
policy .

~esponsibility

for decision-making has at times been vested in

military officials rather than in foreign policy officials .

In other

instances there has been a failure to define and clarify lines of responeibility for policy forculation .

I say this, not so much in criticims as in

- 11 -

recognition of the fact .

It is unlikely that anyone planned it that way;

it has simply happened -- perhaps largely because it was not planned.
The obscuring of the lines or responsibility and authority is perhaps
best illustrated in the issuance of public statements by leaders of the
Armed Services.

Such statements are usually expressed in military termi-

nology .

Orten, however, much of their substance is of a foreign policy

nature.

Perhaps this is unavoidable in view of the complexity or the

matters with which they frequently deal.

One cannot always draw a clear-

cut line between military and political and other factors in a given situation .
The question of rearming Germany will serve to illustrate this point,
and this example finds a counterpart in practically everyother major foreign
policy issue with which we are confronted.

There are strong military

reasons for urging the rearmament of Germany and it is natural for military
personnel to see the need in terms of added divisions of
so forth .

But Germany cannot be rearmed in a vacuum.

manpo~er ,

bases and

Rearmament cannot be

divorced from a whole range of problems concerning European Unity, the fears

of Fr nee , t
Gf'rmo.ny,

of

rol of Britain on th cont1n nt, tb

nd th t:lll.1nt na.ncc of the

therefore , t

t official state

tern Alli nc .

sumnbly kept vcll informed by th

I

of

nts on this

government emnnntc best fro:n our for ign policy official .

the military consideration

to

It

They rc p

Joint Chiefs of Staff vith rc pcct to

involved nd they in turn arc beGt

quip~~

to viev such considerations and to express them public y in t rmG of th
totality of

Am~rican

interests .

I cite this example merely to illustrate the problem of d fining th
role

o~

the military in American foreign policy .

It is not difficult to

see the principal reason for the expansion of military participation in for ign
policy making .

As I mentioned earli r , the nature of varttme and postwar

developments and diplomacy has required a vastly increased uoe of the

~ili-

tary as an instrument of policy.
There is, hovev r 1 still

anoth~r

factor.

The military emerged froc the

var with great prentige 1 both at home and abroad, and this prestige has

- 13 carried over into the postwar period.

On the international scene this

has led to widespread use of prominent military leaders in diplomatic
capacities.

At various periods since the close of World War II three of

our foremost military leaders during the war have served in positions
which were more political than military and which roughly corresponded
to their wartime military roles - - General Eisenhower as NATO commander,
General MacArthur in charge of the occupation of Japan, and General
Marshall as Secretary of State.

Each of these distinguished mili tary

leaders had earned the respect of foreign nations , as well as the American
people, through their outstanding military service.

Each made an exceptional

contribution in their postwar assignments .
other military leaders have also been called upon for diplomatic or
political services -- General dalter Bedell Smith, who served as Ambassador
to the Soviet Union, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Undersecretary of State, and Admiral Alan Kirk, who served as Ambassador to Belgium
and Ambassador to the Soviet Union, are two leading examples .

I could name

two dozen other former generals and admirals now holding civilian positions in

- 14 th~

Federal Gov

r~nt.

Countle

other

through the civilian bureaucraci s of

th~

of field grad

rc

catter d

Federal Gov rncent concern d

~

th

foreign affaire and international organizations.
This increased usc of military leaders in position of a diplocatic
or political nature , of course, bas often been due not only to a cnrry-ov r
of the military prestige of these men, but also to their d m onstrated
ability as vell as their availability for such service.
~
Withou~any

way reflecting on the capacity of any individual I do think

that the vast expansion in the ecployment of military pcroonnal in both the
making nnd carrying out of foreign policy is
give some serious thought.

s~ething

to vbich ve should

It raises questions not only vith respect to

our basic values , but also with respect to our basic foreign policy objectives, including our military security .
First, let me say something about the question vhich I think this trend
poses concerning our basic values.

- 15 Military officers are not different from anyone else in this country.
(t

They come from representative families all over the
the same grade schools and high schools .
religious values .

it.,

0

fJ'f • I

cg'"'*.,.•

They go to

They hold the same social and

But the military profession exacts from those who

pursue it a higher measure of self-sacrifice in the public interest than
·most other professions.

-

The military as a group must accept a higher degree

of training, conditioning, and disciplining toward one objective :
military protection for the Nation .

to provide

That is as it should be and those who

enter the profession, like you men today, understand these conditions .
Like any other professional group the military in their dedication to
their primary

objectiv~

may tend to lose sight of other national objectives .

It appears to me , consequently, that when the military in fact make policy
decisions or when military techniques are excessively applied to carry out
policies which can be more appropriately handled by civilian techniques, we
are in danger of having military objectives and values emphasized at the
expense of other, broader national objectives and values.

- 16 With respect to our basic :foreign po
curity it lf, the
nom more

~diete

xpan ion of th
dangers.

y ob

militnr~y

ti

rol

J

in for

R pon ibility for our

1

1

-Udi

polic) po

ntirc for 1gn pol1c.

1

vbich is concerned vith 1nt rnational econacic, cultural and politic 1
relations , as vell as
~tate.

th~y

~ith

military affairs , io v oted in our ccretary o:f

Our military objectives have no ceaning in themselves exc pt a

tend to further our nonmilitary objectives .

l:f they are given an

independent menning, if they become ends in th mnelves , ve could easily be
led into costly adventures which would only add to the financial and bucan
burdens of the American people and which might ultimately result in widespread public reaction against the military .
distorted emphasis on

milita1~

The best way to avoid a

objectives, the way that is provided under

our constitutional system, 1s to require

tl~t

final authority in foreign

policy decision-making remain unequivocally vith the Secretary of state
under the President of the United Staten.
In terms of our military security
the vider range

~pecifically,

as dist1ngu1

h~d

free

of foreign policy, it appears to me that a fUrther danger

- 17 exists .

Our military experts may weaken their professional stature through

over-anxious acceptance of an increased role in policy matters.
In recent years military leaders have been brought into the lime-light
of public discussions of foreign policy largely as a result of their wellearned public prestige.

Civilian political leaders have tended to rely

heavily on this prestige gained through military accomplishments in order
to support policies affecting our foreign policy.

Generals and Admirals

have been called upon or sent to testify regularly before Congressional
Committees, not only in connection with military appropriations and matters
affecting the individual services , but also in connection with broad issues
of policy, such as economic assistance programs and international alliances.
Military officials, moreover, frequently discuss political issues -- not
necessarily partisan political issues, but issues of a political nature - at public appearances and press conferences.
Marin~

I

~y

say at this point that the

Corps has been singularly free of this type of affliction.

To the

best of my knowledge , the leadership of the Corps has successfully resisted

- 18 the tecptation to assert its expertnc s v rbc.l. y c.nd pub icly not only
in Clilitary natters but over the vhole ra.D8e of human aff ire .

Only n

elected official, constantly beckoned by the siren-call of th pre s ,
radio, and television, can appreciate the extraordinary d gree of selfcontrol that thio represents .

It is one more reason for mA to be proud of

my personal connection with the Corps .

Nov v'ho.t is the danger to our security inherent in the exposure of
military leaders - - whether sought or unsought - - to the political conflicts
of the day?

I t is this; military leaders who are so exposed vill find th m-

selves in agreement vith one side of a political issue and at odds vith the
other .

They vill be applauded by political leaders vhose position they up-

hold and looked upon vith suspicion by their opponents .

When military

officers become subjects of partisan politics they are no longer vieved as
ucbiased, objective career- servants, nor vill their military judgcents be
accepted as those of politically-disinterested professional experts .

From

that , it is only one step to the loss of confidence in the cilitary judgment
of our military leaders .

- 19 This central problem was clearly illustrated prior to the last
presidential election when a Senator publicly called for a change in the
membership of the Joint Chiefs of' Staff.
in their judgment .

lie had, he said1 "lost confidence"

The new administration, moreover, subsequently did

appoint a ne11 Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a "new look" at the military
program.

Surely we cannot have Republican generals and admirals for one

administration and Democratic generals and admirals for the next Without
danger to the national security.
Now, possibly as never before, we cannot afford to play politics with
our security.

No political party, and no faction of a party, stands in

the long-run to benefit from military insecurity in this country .

Certainly,

the Armed Services as a whole do not.
In mentioning this tendency of some military officers to slip into
or to be drawn into the political orbit of our system of

gover~nt ,

I do

not wish to imply that the military experts should have no contact uith
Congress .

Certainly Congress has a right to know what our military experts

11

Co re

1d r tio

t

1

not in thi , but in

mi~itery

ns

oftic rs b

ploy d

xpert

outsid the area of their special competence in support of or
to policy
b

~tterc

oppo

tion

concerning vhich politic 1 end not military d ci ion mu t

mad •

Th re is no cacy solution to this problem .

Part of the ensv r

lie~

in

the r straint vhich civilian leaders must x rei c to avoid placing military
officials on the spot

i~

political issues .

Part of the answer cust also lie

in the fortitude with vh:ch military leaders r sist the temptation to project themselves into

no~ilitary

questions .

This problem may seem renote to you men

n~-,

but within a

years as your careers unfold it msy vell become for

so~

sho~

span of

of you a most

pressing and difficult one .
As I mentioned earlier,

respo~sibility

for maintaining the proper

civilian-military balance in our system of governrrent cust be shared by both
our military leaders and our civilian political leadership .

The military

- 21 -

must exercise the utmost restraint in policy matters , and our civilian
leadership must be willing to take full responsibility for political
decisions .
In foreign relations we need constantly to keep in mind the essential
relationship of military force to total foreign policy .

Military leaders

as well as civilian foreign policy officials must understand the supporting
role of military force .

Military resources, like other tools of foreign

policy, must be available to l our politically accountable civilian policy
makers when, where , and under conditions prescribed by those policy makers.
It is incumbent upon our policy makers that they should take full advantage
of military advice, but when the time for decision-making comes the civilian
policy maker must make the choice and take full responsibllity for that
choice .
How can we preserve this principle, and at the same time provide for

our own military security?

There are no hard and fast rules .

There is only

common sense and a few guideposts appropriate to the present state of world
affairs .

.. sentio.l •hat v r:.n1ntnin th
tr ngth to

A

t the threat of coc=uni t cggrc

ry c1 1to.ry

ion.

At the same tit:le , ho-.,.ever, every effort should b cad

to us

military m asures to conduct foreign policy vherevcr possible .

non-

Thy nr

leso costly, and often they can produce beneficial recults that nrc more
lnDting in their effects .

If ve are to pursue them successfully, ho-.,.ever ,

vc muct learn that every nonmilitary action in foreign policy is not an
act of 'appenseme::>.t."
I vould also suggest that if it bccooes clear that ve ere tending vny,
rather than

to~~ds ,

a general var, ve profit from long years of experience,

and place greater reliance on the Marine Corps as the military force to
support our diplomacy in foreign policy.

In onying this , I am fully avnrc

of the basic need for a multi-service fighting force in I:l.odern varfare.
shnre I know, a great pride in the
extraordinary feats .

V~rines

We

and believe them capable of

But ve muot admit that the Corps has not yet rend r d

the Aro;y, Navy and Air Force obsolete .

- 23 Nevertheless , I still believe that the proper vay to fight "brush
fires" in various parts of the vorld is not vith the forces trained for
general warfare , but vith the specially trained self- sustaining, combat ready forces of the Marine Corps.

No other military group is so vell

suited to immediate service in any part of the world .

No other group is

more competent to keep the expenditure of force close to the requirements
for achieving limited objectives.
Finally, I vant to say that the most important element in the preservation of the principle of civilian control of American Foreign Policy is
to require that our civilian foreign policy officials take full responsi bility for decisions affecting foreign policy.
Your share in maintaining the proper role of the military in foreign

-

policy is , it seems to me , to keep in mind that every action you take in
your official capacities has a bearing on the foreign relations of the
nation.

You uill either contribute to the safety and well- being of the

Uni ted Stntes or you will detract fron it; you cannot be neutral.

And if

you ;.rould contribute to :ii; , as - !·now you wish to do, then you will maintain

t

hish

en£

of patriotic

fulfi l.oent of your dutie" .
in your prof

-

nd prof

onl

ibi

it~

i

t

You \:ill f od y ur per o

s ion by understanding your pnrt in th

p r:;pccti v

Corp&, in the larger perspective of the Arm-d S rvic ~ ,
tivc of the total interests of our country .

of th

nd in th

per pee-

